Corporate Social Responsibility as Obligated Internalisation of Social Costs by Johnston, Andrew et al.
Vol.:(0123456789) 
Journal of Business Ethics 
https://doi.org/10.1007/s10551-019-04329-y
ORIGINAL PAPER
Corporate Social Responsibility as Obligated Internalisation of Social 
Costs
Andrew Johnston1 · Kenneth Amaeshi2,3,4 · Emmanuel Adegbite5,6  · Onyeka Osuji7
Received: 27 February 2017 / Accepted: 22 October 2019 
© The Author(s) 2019
Abstract
We propose that corporations should be subject to a legal obligation to identify and internalise their social costs or nega-
tive externalities. Our proposal reframes corporate social responsibility (CSR) as obligated internalisation of social costs, 
and relies on reflexive governance through mandated hybrid fora. We argue that our approach advances theory, as well as 
practice and policy, by building on and going beyond prior attempts to address social costs, such as prescriptive government 
regulation, Coasian bargaining and political CSR.
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Introduction
Ideally, under the influence of competitive market forces 
and other incentives, corporations play a key role in the gen-
eration and distribution of social costs. As such, the quest 
to address the social costs arising from business activities 
is at the heart of the corporate social responsibility (CSR) 
movement. However, the highly influential neoclassical eco-
nomic approach to CSR, achieves little in terms of address-
ing social costs, because externalities are only internalised 
where internalisation aligns with, or is expected to improve, 
corporate financial performance (Amaeshi 2010; Orlitzky 
2011; Adegbite et al. 2019). The key question, which is often 
overlooked, is: should corporations abandon the internalisa-
tion of their negative externalities if this is not expected to 
result in improved financial performance? In other words, 
should corporations ignore the social costs they create in 
their pursuit of profit unless they can be addressed prof-
itably? If corporations are expected to address them, how 
should they go about this?
The governance of social costs1 (i.e. negative externali-
ties) created by corporations is a perennial concern. Since 
Coase (1960), economists have generally argued that the 
solution to externalities is either instrumental regulation2 or 
bargaining between the creator and the victim (Coasian bar-
gaining)3 of the externalities. The regulator should choose 
between these two options based on a cost–benefit analysis. 
In particular, regulators are required to compare the costs 
associated with government intervention with the transac-
tion costs confronting parties when they attempt to deal 
with a particular externality by means of a contract. Many 
economists assume that regulatory costs (including the costs 
of producing and enforcing regulation and the distortions 
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1 Social costs here include environmental and ecological costs or 
externalities. As such we have used social costs and negative exter-
nalities interchangeably.
2 This includes both regulation and taxation, with the State designing 
and implementing rules and incentives intended to change behaviour 
in order to achieve the desired goal of mitigating a particular social 
cost. By instrumental regulation, we mean instrumental regulation of 
a specific negative externality (hereafter, instrumental regulation or 
simply, regulation).
3 By Coasian bargaining, we mean bargaining between the creator of 
the social cost and a specific stakeholder, who might be an individual 
or an affected group, with a view to resolving the issue to the satisfac-
tion of all concerned (hereafter, Coasian bargaining).
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of economic activity that may arise) will be very high, so 
the ‘cure’ of regulation will normally be worse than the 
‘disease’ of externalities, making government intervention 
undesirable from an efficiency standpoint (Shleifer 2005).4 
This makes many economists sanguine about leaving the 
correction of some, or even most, externalities to the market, 
even though market failure led to the externalities in the 
first place. They then assume that if the parties fail to reach 
an agreement on a solution to a particular externality, this 
will be for transaction costs reasons, and as such, leaving 
the externality where it falls is the most efficient outcome 
in the circumstances. This approach overlooks the fact that 
externalities are real impacts on real people and the environ-
ment. It also assumes that negative externalities are only 
worth addressing where many people are affected. However, 
negative externalities are injuries (Honneth 1997).
Notwithstanding, externalities can also be positive—e.g. 
where a company contributes positively to the provision 
and administration of public goods and policies, especially 
in weak or unstable democracies. Scherer et al. (2013) call 
this Political Corporate Social Responsibility (PCSR). They 
see PCSR as a manifestation of corporate citizenship (Mat-
ten and Crane 2005), which strongly endorses the corporate 
provision and administration of citizens’ rights in instances 
where the state is unable to do so. Nonetheless, in such 
situations, characterised by significant democratic deficit 
(Scherer et al. 2013), a firm risks losing legitimacy because 
it does not often have the democratic mandate to provide and 
administer such public goods and governance; and therein 
lies the paradox of PCSR, as the extension of corporate 
citizenship. To address this challenge, Scherer et al. (2013) 
call for a multi-stakeholder corporate governance system, 
which will require interested parties to address externalities 
through the processes of deliberative democracy (Habermas 
1996, 1998). This emerging approach aptly situates PCSR 
in the public policy domain (Scherer and Palazzo 2011; 
Scherer et al. 2014, 2016), but views it from a non-market 
strategy perspective (Baron 1995), which “…must not be 
confused with private behavior ‘that is appropriate in the 
market place’ (Elster 1986, p. 111)” (Scherer et al. 2013, 
p. 479).
In this article, we take the public policy view of PCSR 
seriously, but unlike Scherer et al. (2013), we approach it 
from the perspective of correcting market failure. This per-
spective accepts that “…companies decide on public issues 
and deliberately cause externalities, meaning they ‘affect 
other people’ (Elster 1986, p. 111) who have no contractual 
relationship with the company and enjoy (in the case of state 
or regulatory failure) no protection by the state authorities” 
(Scherer et al. 2013, p. 479), because such externalities are 
normalised and tolerated as the inevitable outcomes of mar-
ket failure. In other words, we take the view that addressing 
negative externalities should be obligatory even if they are 
borne by what appears to be a negligible number of people 
and/or things. In focussing on negative externalities as mani-
festations of market failure (Coase 1960), we argue that the 
conventional regulatory toolbox for addressing such exter-
nalities is incomplete. We submit that prescriptive govern-
ment regulation or Coasian bargaining only offers a partial 
governance of externalities in a globalised economy, which 
is characterised by factually and technologically complex 
chains of causation (Kim and Davis 2016). This shortcoming 
is further compounded when managers have to articulate a 
business case for action even though the social costs cre-
ated by business actions affect a far wider range of interests, 
beyond those of shareholders. We thus propose an alterna-
tive possible solution: obligated internalisation of social 
costs (or reflexive governance of negative externalities by 
corporations), through multi-stakeholder fora.
Reflexive governance is an inventive approach to regu-
lation (Osuji 2015). It refers to the processes, procedures 
and relationships for mutual transformations of corporations 
and society. For example, when regulations require multi-
stakeholder consultations to be undertaken before certain 
business decisions, which may have environmental impacts 
or market monopoly implications are made, an underlying 
assumption is that the process will facilitate a decision that 
has considered the interests of the firm and the stakeholders 
like employees, consumers, local residents and rival firms. 
These stakeholders are in a better position than the firm or a 
public regulator to articulate their interests. While the com-
pany may technically comply with the regulatory require-
ment by engaging in a series of bilateral consultations with 
stakeholders, the resulting decision may not be transforma-
tive of society since the different segments of society have 
not actually engaged with each other. Reflexive governance 
addresses this by demanding that consultations are under-
taken in a collective process that allows all stakeholders to 
be present and listen to, reflect on and respond to one anoth-
er’s views. The process will assist in arriving at decisions 
that can positively transform society despite the disparate 
nature of the interests of the stakeholders who represent dif-
ferent segments of society.
Reflexive governance further recognises that social costs 
are complex and that any attempt to address them requires 
collaborative efforts. In other words, single actors such as 
corporations, civil societies, or governments cannot deal 
with these challenges in isolation. Reflexive governance 
builds on Teubner’s (1993) reflexive law theory, which sup-
ports the organisational and procedural norms necessary for 
4 Shleifer (2005) refers to the Chicago school notion that markets and 
litigation can solve most problems, and that even where regulators are 
not captured and try to promote social welfare, ‘they are incompetent 
and rarely succeed’, a critique of regulation which Shleifer describes 
as ‘one of the finest moments of twentieth century economics’.
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decentralised self-regulation of social subsystems, includ-
ing corporations. By stressing the importance of ‘relation-
ships’ and ‘mutual transformations of firms and society’ as 
governance outcomes, reflexive governance allows firms to 
be influenced by, and act on the basis of, facts, norms and 
values developed in collaboration with other social actors 
through a process of discussion. Since the key factor for the 
relevant facts, norms and values is ‘mutual transformation’, 
a self-centred and inward-looking business case approach to 
social costs is inadequate. Rather, the requirement of mutu-
ality creates space for, and indeed requires, an approach to 
corporate internalisation of social costs, which is oriented 
towards society and is an instrument of public policy.
Viewing CSR through the lens of reflexive governance 
is very useful. For example, Scherer et al. (2013) call for 
multiple stakeholder fora to address the democratic deficits 
inherent in the contemporary practice of CSR. Our approach, 
which is grounded in solving market failures by addressing 
negative externalities, as opposed to the role of companies 
in creating positive externalities, aims to extend Scherer 
et al. (2013)’s PCSR. However, our contribution goes a 
step further by proposing a legal obligation to engage with 
stakeholders to identify social costs and elaborate acceptable 
solutions to them. Based on this understanding of reflex-
ive governance and its link to political CSR, we argue that 
corporations should be mandated to establish ‘hybrid fora’, 
which would bring together creators of, and those affected 
by, externalities in order to trace those social costs and 
identify mutually acceptable solutions to them. The article 
proceeds with a critical account of the limitations of (1) 
instrumental regulation; (2) market-based solutions (Coasian 
bargaining); and (3) political CSR as approaches to deal-
ing with the problems of social costs. Thereafter, it presents 
our approach of governing externalities through obligated 
internalisation of social costs through hybrid fora and the 
corporate decision-making process. Finally, it highlights 
some of the contributions and implications of this approach.
Governance of Externalities Through 
Instrumental Regulation
Economists accept that economic activities sometimes pro-
duce externalities, or ‘external diseconomies’ for outsiders 
or third parties. They also accept that the creation of nega-
tive externalities is a market failure, in the sense that where 
social cost exceeds private cost, the market does not neces-
sarily achieve an efficient allocation of resources. Address-
ing externalities through regulation and taxation is however 
problematic. This is because they are both blunt instruments 
of social steering which produce distortions or second order 
effects. The practical impossibility of anticipating those sec-
ond order effects means the regulator cannot determine a 
rate of taxation that will match the environmental cost and 
produce the common good; it will always be too high or too 
low. Nevertheless, under political pressure to justify their 
interventions, regulators often ignore this uncertainty and 
produce clear cost–benefit analyses of the impact they expect 
proposed regulatory interventions to have.
Furthermore, instrumental regulation faces a trilemma 
(Picciotto 2017) when faced with the problem of governing 
externalities. First, the law may be irrelevant in situations 
where corporations produce externalities across borders, and 
outside the reach of (national) regulation. Second, it may be 
difficult for the regulator to identify social costs before they 
occur. For example, if a regulator does not know the nature 
of the externality, let alone the harm it causes or the extent of 
its effects, adopting the precautionary principle will result in 
regulation that is under- or over-inclusive, distorting social 
and economic arrangements. This means regulation may be 
entirely lacking. Vatn and Bromley (1997) emphasise that 
externalities are novelties that are mostly recognised after 
they have been produced. This is compounded by the fact 
that there are often ‘large time spans between when a physi-
cal act (e.g. emission) takes place, and when one becomes 
aware of the external effects it creates’ (Vatn and Bromley 
1997, p. 137). Hence, it is very difficult, if not impossible, 
to govern unpredictable externalities, such as the socio-
technical externalities which result from new technology, 
by means of ex -ante regulation.
If the law tries to avoid the first two aspects of the tri-
lemma, it is likely to produce disintegrating effects on itself. 
As production processes become more complex and supply 
chains become longer, regulation has to abandon general 
principles applicable to entire industries or the economy as a 
whole in favour of an approach, which differentiates between 
individual firms, and even individual activities. This third 
aspect of the trilemma greatly increases regulatory costs. 
A good example is the response to the 2007–2008 global 
financial crisis, which focused on crisis management at the 
expense of underlying principles. In particular, government 
interventions, following the crisis, rescued the economic sta-
tus quo with the disastrous effect that ‘the complexity gap 
between the legal system and its societal environment was 
almost completely levelled’ (Renner 2011, p. 100). Given 
the complexities of governing externalities through regu-
lation, we now examine the option of bargaining between 
those concerned by an externality.
Governance of Externalities Through 
‘Coasian Bargaining’
Coase (1960) argued that addressing social costs through 
instrumental regulation would not necessarily increase social 
wealth for a number of reasons. First, the cost of government 
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intervention is often high. Second, government intervention 
distorts the incentives of actors within the economic system 
and so changes their behaviour. Given these effects of inter-
vention, Coase offers regulators an alternative to taxation 
or regulation: they can do nothing, and leave the particular 
social cost to possible negotiation between the creator and 
victim. As long as the transaction costs are lower than the 
gains from trade, self-interested economic agents should 
trade. Thus, Coasian bargaining refers to a process in which 
those concerned by an externality bargain to (re)allocate the 
right to create (or to be free from) the externality (Coase 
1960). Presumably, since this is a market transaction, the 
right will be allocated to the party which values it most 
highly. If the right is not reassigned, Coasian economists 
argue that it is either because it is already efficiently allo-
cated, or because transaction costs meant that it was not 
worth transferring the right.
While this view has garnered support from economists, 
we argue that Coase’s approach is counter-intuitive in law 
because he ‘not only rides roughshod over notions of correc-
tive justice, he also undermines fundamental notions of cau-
sation’ (Ogus 2006, p. 8). The governance of externalities 
requires a much broader inquiry into how to allocate soci-
ety’s resources in order to increase aggregate social wealth. 
For instance, the assumption that the government can make 
a socially adequate choice between intervening with instru-
mental regulation and doing nothing requires some heroic 
epistemological assumptions. In order to compare the costs 
and benefits of regulation versus doing nothing, the regulator 
must try to anticipate how the parties will respond to regula-
tion and how those responses will affect total social wealth. 
However, any attempt to predict the impact of a regulation 
on something as complex as a large, modern economy or the 
physical environment is very problematic (Vatn and Bromley 
1997; Hiedenpää and Bromley 2016).
There are two other important weaknesses of ‘Coasian 
bargaining’. First, there is an assumption that ‘an initial dis-
tribution of private ownership rights is exogenously given’ 
(Aoki 2001, p. 36). This means that the parties can bargain, 
knowing what their legal rights are in relation to a contested 
action. However, this does not correspond with legal schol-
arship, which suggests that rights are, very rarely (if ever), 
clearly allocated ex ante (Simpson 1996, pp. 86–87; Mil-
haupt and Pistor 2008; Morgan 2005). In short, if the law 
is not clear, rational calculation becomes impossible and 
‘Coasian bargaining’ becomes indeterminate, with the out-
come more like ‘mutual accommodation’ than a means of 
optimal resource allocation.
The second weakness is the assumption that transaction 
costs are the only barrier for wealth-enhancing bargains to 
reallocate property rights in relation to a particular social 
cost. If this is not the case, a regulator who carries out a 
cost–benefit analysis will not identify all the relevant costs 
and might not select the most appropriate governance struc-
ture for the externality. Moreover, it is essential for a regula-
tor who is examining a situation in which no agreement is 
reached to understand why this is the case, as this will influ-
ence the regulator’s decision on whether regulation can be 
justified on efficiency grounds. In addition, dispersed victims 
will encounter further obstacles to collective action, such as 
free rider problems, and will have to bear the costs of set-
ting up a governance structure to coordinate their dealings 
with the corporation. Even if they manage to coordinate their 
efforts, the absence of default structures has strong distribu-
tional effects, with affected groups having to bear the costs 
of establishing an appropriate structure on a case-by-case 
basis. Thus, if Coasian bargaining is to be a realistic means 
of governing externalities in medium to large numbers sce-
narios, the law should arguably provide institutional support 
for coalitions of the affected, by means of default rules.
While the concept of transaction costs has undergone 
considerable expansion in the literature, there are other, 
behavioural and sociological barriers to wealth-enhancing 
reallocations of resources, which are rarely brought within 
the category of transaction costs. These are difficult to evalu-
ate and greatly reduce the likelihood that the parties to an 
externality will strike a bargain. For instance, where one 
agent acts or takes decisions that harm the well-being of 
another, this will give rise to acrimony, especially among 
geographical neighbours. Some people will therefore refuse 
to bargain for ‘psychological or sociological’ reasons.5 
As Vatn and Bromley (1994) put it, the moral dimension 
intrudes into the presumed clarity of economic choice. 
This means that people may value something highly, but 
be unwilling to pay for it because they do not consider it 
appropriate to pay for something to which they believe they 
have an entitlement. These effects are well-documented in 
the endowment effect literature (Korobkin 2014), which sug-
gests that people value rights they possess more highly than 
rights they might acquire. This effect presumably extends to 
5 People rarely want to talk to, let alone bargain with, someone who 
has been impinging on their quiet enjoyment because this creates 
antagonism, and they are disinclined ‘to think of the rights at stake in 
these cases as readily commensurable with cash’ (Farnsworth 1999, 
p. 384). So, for example, people rarely if ever bargain around nui-
sance injunctions, and they are highly unlikely to be willing to pay 
a polluter so that they can have the clean water they believe they are 
entitled to. Individuals who imagine with some conviction that, say, 
their drinking water should be uncontaminated, will be expected to be 
unimpressed, if not irate, about having to pay to prevent it from being 
even more contaminated’ (Vatn and Bromley 1994, p. 141). Accord-
ing to Mishan (1993), a more ‘cynical view’ would compare the argu-
ment that the ‘victim’ of the externality should pay the creator with 
a ‘protection racket’, according to which both the victim who is left 
unbeaten and the gang who are paid for not administering a beating 
are better off. Regardless of the effect on aggregate social wealth, a 
reluctance to pay not to be beaten is to be expected (Mishan 1993).
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the rights people believe they possess because they enjoyed 
access to particular resources in the past. Coase’s model 
therefore contradicts the idea that people’s willingness to 
bargain depends to a considerable extent on the perceived 
fairness or morality of the other party.
Also, and relatedly, Vatn and Bromley (1994) empha-
sise that individuals may be unwilling to pay to preserve 
the environment because they consider it incongruous to 
treat environmental ‘goods and services’ in the same way 
as commodities. The authors refer to survey evidence, in 
which people say that species diversity is very important 
for non-instrumental reasons, which shows that they value 
it highly. However, people are unwilling to pay to preserve 
species diversity. This may be because it is inappropriate to 
choose between a moral principle and ordinary consumption 
goods. Also, people view preserving species diversity, along 
with other public goods like a clean environment, as a pub-
lic matter (Lévêque 1999). It may also be because there is 
no institutional framework that helps them understand how 
these things should be valued. As such, one cannot assume 
that the absence of ‘environmental’ bargains is an indication 
that social wealth is maximised.
Furthermore, the parties may not even agree on the 
nature, existence and extent of the externality. Bargaining 
can only occur when there are relevant facts available for all 
parties concerned. Like transaction costs, the costs of con-
structing facts are highly relevant to any analysis regarding 
the form of governance that will be the most cost effective 
in dealing with a particular externality (Johnston 2011). For 
example, the costs associated with a commission of inquiry 
show that governments face high costs of fact production. 
Since facts have to be constructed before the most appro-
priate governance can be identified, it follows that Coasian 
bargaining is unsuitable to prevent irreversible harms. In 
the case of a complex system like the environment, the con-
sequences of relying on ex post governance may be very 
serious. An apparently small externality may result in cata-
strophic consequences where a particular species or other 
aspect of the environment is functionally transparent in the 
sense that its contribution to the complex system as a whole 
is not known until it is removed (Vatn and Bromley 1994). 
If the regulator refrains from constructing the facts, leaving 
the matter to those concerned, any bargaining process will 
also have to confront both transaction costs and the costs of 
fact production. At present, and as economists recognise, 
the only institutional structure of fact production available 
to the parties is litigation, which gives rise to very high costs 
(Shleifer 2010).
Besides, the disparity in resources between a corpora-
tion and a private citizen cannot but have an influence on 
the outcome of any negotiations or litigation between them. 
Victims of externalities created by large corporations are 
likely to be risk-averse concerning starting litigation due to 
the high costs involved and the stress from legal proceed-
ings. This is because they have a personal interest at stake (in 
comparison with the corporation’s managers and sharehold-
ers) and because they are more likely to be directly involved 
in the proceedings. All of these will be well understood by 
corporations (or at least their lawyers), and will therefore 
influence any negotiations which take place between them. 
The corporation will certainly put the complainants to proof, 
which has the effect of transferring all the fact construc-
tion costs onto them. Corporations may also be able to use 
their superior resources to increase those costs by hiring 
all the available local experts, and using procedural rules 
strategically to overwhelm the complainants. If affected indi-
viduals seek to pool resources and form a group to advance 
their complaint, the corporation can respond to the threat or 
initiation of litigation with ‘divide and conquer’ strategies. 
Finally, the corporation can supplement these legal strategies 
with a public relations campaign, claiming that the issue is 
one that should be dealt with by government, while retain-
ing lobbyists to persuade the government in question not 
to intervene (Brueckner and Ross 2010; Parchomovsky and 
Siegelman 2004).
Together, these arguments suggest that—in legal practice 
rather than economic theory—Coasian bargaining is, and 
will always be, a rare occurrence.6 Whether these obstacles 
to bargaining are subsumed into the transaction costs cat-
egory, or whether they are viewed as a separate category 
of costs, they suggest that bargaining will be a rare—and 
expensive—way of dealing with corporate externalities. The 
economist’s answer is that if these costs are high, making 
bargaining unlikely, and if government regulation is also 
costly, then social costs should be left where they fall. This 
might be acceptable if externalities were a rare outcome of 
economic activity, allowing economists simply to assume 
that the social gains from particular economic activities 
outweigh the social costs. However, once we move away 
from neoclassical economic models with their operating pre-
sumption that market failure is an exceptional case, there 
is growing acceptance that externalities are pervasive. This 
suggests that, before we can be sanguine about leaving social 
costs where they fall, we ought to attempt to identify them 
and quantify their economic impact. Given the significant 
challenges confronting Coasian bargaining, we now pro-
ceed to highlight the recent developments and challenges 
in governing externalities through political CSR, and then 
leverage these to advance our alternative model of obligated 
corporate internalisation of social costs.
6 For a rare attempt to examine whether Coasian bargaining takes 
place as an empirical matter, see Farnsworth (1999).
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Governance of Externalities Through 
Political CSR
Despite the increase in governmental involvement in CSR 
regulation across the world,7 the role of government in the 
business and society debate remains understudied in the lit-
erature (Dentchev et al. 2017; Osuji 2015; Adegbite 2012; 
Scherer et al. 2016; Ehrnström-Fuentes 2016), especially 
in conceptual and theoretical terms (Gond et al. 2011). The 
general assumption of a strict division of labour that views 
governments as political actors and firms as economic actors 
(Sundaram and Inkpen 2004) has been displaced by glo-
balisation (Scherer and Smid 2000; Marcus and Fremeth 
2009; Margolis and Walsh 2003; Scherer and Palazzo 2011; 
Kaul et al. 2003). In that regard, the tension between ‘new 
problems and received solutions’, coupled with the power 
shift arising from the loss of governmental influence over 
multinational corporations, suggests the need for a new type 
of governance. As globalisation has given rise to a series 
of interdependencies between economic and social actors, 
especially in terms of risks, competition and opportunities 
(Beck 2000; Held et al. 1999), this new type of govern-
ance will need to address those interdependencies and their 
consequences.
These developments set the stage for the emergence of 
political CSR, which can be defined as businesses engaging 
in activities that are traditionally understood as governmen-
tal activities (such as provision of education, infrastructure, 
goods and services), in order to contribute to public policies 
and governance (Scherer and Palazzo 2011; Scherer et al. 
2014). Political CSR has broadened the scope of governance 
and regulation and blurred the roles of public and private 
actors. It has, for example, created interest in ‘the phenom-
enon of “new” and “experimentalist” governance and its 
relationship to law’ (De Burca 2010, p. 227), as well as the 
concept of ‘relational state’ that implies shared co-regula-
tory responsibility of public and private actors (Gunning-
ham 2012; Ho 2013; Lozano et al. 2008; Osuji 2015). As 
such, Brammer et al. (2012, p. 7) argue that we should seek 
to place CSR explicitly within a wider field of economic 
governance carried out by the market, state regulation and 
other methods. As a form of governmental involvement, 
political CSR therefore focuses on collective deliberations 
and concern for (global) public goods (Scherer et al. 2014) 
such as the European Commission’s ‘Multi-Stakeholder 
Forum’ (Scherer et al. 2013) and ‘CSR Alliance’ (Buhmann 
2011). In developing countries, political CSR may also lead 
to corporations filling institutional voids created by govern-
ment neglect (Amaeshi et al. 2016; Adegbite and Nakajima 
2011).
Scherer and Palazzo (2011) further posit a thematic char-
acterisation for political CSR that takes into consideration a 
number of factors including the self-regulatory role of CSR, 
which provides a new institutional role for private actors 
in a regulatory context. Scherer et al. (2013) argued that 
political CSR offers an opportunity to democratise corporate 
governance to compensate for the democratic deficit inher-
ent in corporate political activity and corporate citizenship 
theories and practices. However, their suggestion is based 
on soft law and self-regulation. The transition from hard to 
soft law also changes the way private actors are regulated, 
because the process is devoid of governmental influence and 
sanctions (Shelton 2000). Nevertheless, the contribution of 
self-regulatory engagement to resolving political and social 
issues may be ambiguous (Scherer et al. 2009), especially 
due to the lack of governmental control and enforcement 
mechanisms. It is therefore important to evaluate private 
regulation in terms of competing self-regulatory initiatives 
and measure the level of co-operation between firms and 
civil society actors (Scherer and Palazzo 2011).
As such, despite the benefits of political CSR, it has been 
criticised as a product of globalisation (Whelan 2012) that 
over-stresses the role of businesses in global regulation and 
excludes local and regional governance (Scherer et al. 2016). 
As a form of global governance, the conflicting standards 
and moral dilemmas arising from political CSR can cause 
local–global tension among multiple stakeholders (Pless and 
Maak 2011; Child and Rodrigues 2011; Jones and Fleming 
2003). In this regard, Scherer et al. (2016) considered the 
new role of businesses in moving away from compliance 
with moral standards to a more politically inclined activ-
ity that does not fit with the current view that CSR should 
be confined to business case scenarios. Their comprehen-
sive articulation defines political CSR as: ‘those responsi-
ble business activities that turn corporations into political 
actors, by engaging in public deliberations, collective deci-
sions, and the provision of public goods or the restrictions 
of public bad in cases where public authorities are unable 
or unwilling to fulfil this role. This includes but is not lim-
ited to, corporate contributions to different areas of govern-
ance, such as public health, education, public infrastruc-
ture, the enforcement of social and environmental standards 
along supply chains or the fight against global warming, 
7 A close look at European countries reveals a combination of hard 
regulation (such as France and Denmark) and soft regulation in 
the form of endorsements (for example The Netherlands) reflect-
ing the influence of State governments in shaping CSR engagement 
for businesses in the society (Albareda et al. 2008). Even in the US 
with seemingly explicit CSR embedded within different institu-
tional frameworks (Matten and Moon 2008) and a more discretion-
ary approach to CSR with little governmental intervention (Dentchev 
et  al. 2017; Williams and Aguilera 2008), notable regulatory 
responses on issues such as health, and environment have emerged 
in the last few decades (Vogel 2012), as well as academic literature 
advocating governmental involvement in regulation of the interna-
tional activities of multinational companies (Aaronson 2005).
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corruption, discrimination or inequality. These corporate 
engagements are responsible because they are directed to 
the effective resolution of public issues in a legitimate man-
ner, often with the (explicit) aim of contributing to society 
or enhancing social welfare, and are thus not limited to eco-
nomic motivations’ (Scherer et al. 2016, p. 276).
The heterogeneity of this definition leaves it open to 
political and economic adaptations for CSR. Given that the 
literature on the dynamics of capitalism posits that CSR is 
predominantly determined by individual countries (Kang 
and Moon 2012), the division of labour between govern-
ments, businesses and civil societies is characterised by 
institutionally different approaches among nations (Albareda 
et al. 2008; Hall and Soskice 2001), thus requiring new 
institutional adaptations for political CSR (Amaeshi et al. 
2016). However, the concept of political CSR has provoked 
further thoughts on the evolving role of corporations in soci-
ety. While political CSR advocates for new measures to be 
taken to integrate organisations into society-wide processes 
of political governance (Scherer and Palazzo 2007, 2011; 
Scherer et al. 2006 , 2016), it also raises the question of 
whether businesses should be subject to greater democratic 
control (Matten and Crane 2005; Crane et al. 2009).
For example, Hussain and Moriarty (2016) argue that the 
present political CSR literature considers corporations as 
supervising authorities capable of holding others accounta-
ble in contrast with their position as functionaries and agents 
who must be held accountable (see also Fooks et al. 2013; 
Scherer et al. 2013). In addressing the need for greater dem-
ocratic accountability, Hussain and Moriarty (2016) focused 
on Palazzo and Scherer’s (2006) model of multi-stakeholder 
governance to identify a fundamental democratic deficit of 
political CSR arising from the ‘misconception’ of corpora-
tions as political organisations capable of social deliberation. 
They argue that the current model of democratic account-
ability, which allows corporations to become involved in 
policy-making and governance structures in the same man-
ner as political organisations and private citizens, falls short 
of deliberative democracy where issues of public concern 
are regulated by ‘free, unforced, rational deliberation of 
citizens’ (Hussain and Moriarty 2016, p. 2). They therefore 
propose a concept of a politically representative organisa-
tion (PRO) to refer to ‘an organization that can legitimately 
represent a group of citizens in social deliberation’ (Hus-
sain and Moriarty 2016, p. 9). They suggest a new form 
of democratic accountability that views corporations as 
functionaries or agents to whom parties are responsible, 
thus limiting political CSR to collaborations with political 
NGOs and other groups that meet PRO standards (Hussain 
and Moriarty 2016).
Notwithstanding the variation of opinions in the extant lit-
erature, studies show that political CSR, including the inter-
actions of private actors with local and regional governments 
to engage in activities that enhance social welfare, generally 
tends to reduce negative externalities (Marti and Scherer 
2016; Wood and Wright 2015; Bell and Hindmoor 2009; 
Levi-Faur 2005). Given the prospects as well as challenges 
of political CSR in governing externalities, and as the pre-
vious sections have shown that instrumental regulation and 
Coasian bargaining cannot provide either sufficient or effi-
cient governance of externalities, we proceed to extend the 
debate on political CSR by broadening its conceptualisation 
to include externality internalisation as an obligation.
Reflexive Governance Through Obligated 
Corporate Internalisation of Externalities
There is an emerging paradigm that CSR, as the governance 
of externalities, can be obligated with a variety of legal pro-
visions ranging from reporting to prescriptive rules (Osuji 
2011, 2012, 2015). A purely prescriptive approach does not 
sit well with fundamental assumptions about CSR because 
legal compulsion of ‘social obligations’ is in itself a contra-
diction (Osuji 2015). Moreover, it requires the regulator to 
overcome the many difficulties we identified earlier in this 
article, such as identifying and addressing potential nega-
tive impacts of business decisions on the environment and 
assorted stakeholders. Both public regulators and firms may 
lack sufficient information to identify the nature and breadth 
of potential negative impacts or to articulate the interests of 
different stakeholders like employees, consumers, residents 
and rival firms. Even when regulation requires the firm to 
consult different stakeholders, the bilateral and disconnected 
form of the consultations makes them less likely to have 
a transformative positive impact on society than a collec-
tive process involving all the stakeholders that represent 
the different segments of society. Nonetheless, there are 
legal provisions on issues such as the definition, justifica-
tions, reporting and even enforcement of CSR (Osuji and 
Obibuaku 2016). We therefore consider that legal provisions 
intended to drive reflexive governance should impose a bind-
ing obligation on corporations to identify and internalise 
social costs.
Reflexive governance is an inventive approach to corpo-
rate regulation and refers to the processes, procedures and 
relationships for mutual transformations of corporations 
and society. As noted earlier, reflexive governance demands 
that consultations are undertaken in a collective process that 
allows all stakeholders to be present and listen to, reflect 
on and respond to one another’s views, in order to arrive 
at decisions that can positively transform society despite 
the disparate nature of the interests of the stakeholders who 
represent different segments of society. The UK National 
Institute for Health and Care Excellence (NICE) arguably 
provides a useful practical example of obligated reflexive 
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governance.8 The procedures designed and implemented 
by NICE have enhanced the regulation of complex areas 
through the emergence of guidelines on evidence-based 
best practices that relevant professionals and practitioners 
are compelled to be aware of and apply; knowing that fail-
ure to do so can attract legal and professional disciplinary 
consequences. In contrast, the 2015 Volkswagen’s emission 
scandal highlights the absence of robust and transparent 
guidelines for ensuring that car pollution tests match real 
driving conditions. The public regulators lacked sufficient 
information and ability to issue such ex ante guidelines and 
the car manufacturers were unwilling to do so either uni-
laterally or as an industry. Things may have been different 
if car manufacturers were required by law to participate 
in a collaborative multi-stakeholder forum including car 
users, researchers and technical experts. By bringing rel-
evant expertise, experience and evidence into the process, 
this would potentially bridge the gap between laboratory 
tests and real world conditions, and introduce an element of 
reflexivity into the overarching emissions control framework 
of public regulation.
Using reflexive law to anchor CSR as a form of reflexive 
governance helps us to extend Scherer and Palazzo’s (2007) 
theoretical exposition of Habermasian ideal discourse. For 
example, while they relied mainly on a political philoso-
phy theoretical framework to advocate a new role for the 
firm as a political actor in a globalising society, we rely on 
the theory of reflexive law to suggest other ways in which 
firms and other actors can contribute to this process. Where 
Scherer and Palazzo’s framework is limited in terms of 
precise regulatory intervention and the attendant implica-
tions for firms which do or do not play the role of political 
actors, our obligated approach helps to regulate corpora-
tions, ‘that otherwise would be impossible to regulate’ (Feb-
brajo 1992, p. 30). Our reflexive CSR model also lessens 
the tension between the positivist (instrumental/normative) 
and post-positivist (relative) CSR framing and is particularly 
appropriate for complex, functionally differentiated societies 
where prescriptive interventions in the legal system create 
interference or ‘irritations’ in other social subsystems such 
as the economy or corporations (Teubner 1993). Our fram-
ing of obligated internalisation of social costs, as comple-
mentary to hard law and/or Coasian bargaining, advances the 
concept of the firm as a political actor, while recognising the 
democratic gap (Hussain and Moriarty 2016). It also draws 
attention to the firm’s limitations in terms of societal legiti-
macy, potentially allowing the firm through self-regulation 
to achieve the objectives of political CSR, relying more on 
internal governance, and less on other actors, such as regula-
tors, who are external to the firm.
We argue that the theory of reflexive law provides a pow-
erful justification for using the corporate decision-making 
process to govern externalities. In particular, reflexive law 
avoids the regulatory trilemma, discussed earlier, by under-
standing and working with the autonomy of corporate deci-
sion-making processes, but also steering them so that they 
are more likely to identify and take account of the effects 
they have on their environment. The examples given above 
draw on reflexive governance techniques. No doubt, stake-
holder advisory boards, human rights due diligence groups, 
and a wide array of multi-stakeholder memoranda of under-
standing, agreements and other soft laws have been devel-
oped to make firms across different countries accountable for 
their social costs. Transnational soft laws, country-specific 
hard laws and various combinations of the two certainly 
have a role to play in terms of promoting increased non-
shareholder democratic control over corporate action, but on 
their own they are insufficient. Legal obligations grounded in 
reflexive law can complement these mechanisms and make 
internalisation of externalities more likely.
In autopoietic systems theory, which forms the basis for 
the theory of reflexive law, corporations are understood as 
the law’s reconstruction and personification of the organisa-
tions which it observes in its environment and which meets 
specified criteria laid down by the law itself (Teubner 1993). 
Organisations are therefore social subsystems, which consist 
of linked decisions, and those decisions determine what the 
corporation selects as relevant from its environment, as well 
as how it responds to those selections. Firms are ‘autopoi-
etic’ because they themselves produce the decisions of 
which they consist according to their own logic and without 
direct input from their environment. In other words, firms 
have qualified autonomy from their environment, which 
they construct within their own internal communications, 
according to their own procedures. Within organisations, 
each decision forms the premise for the decisions which fol-
low it, which means that it serves as ‘a normative point of 
reference’ to be ‘taken into account in the process of gener-
ating, recognising, and connecting operations as decisions 
8 NICE, which is responsible for issuing clinical guidelines and 
service guidance, adopts a multi-stakeholder approach through the 
National Collaborating Centres (NCCs) and Guideline Development 
Groups (GDGs) for particular topics. The NCCs consist of multiple 
partnerships of healthcare professional organisations, patient asso-
ciations and academic institutions to ensure a systematic, robust and 
transparent development, dissemination and implementation of guide-
lines and guidance in areas such as primary care, acute care, social 
care, chronic conditions, mental health, cancer (Hargest and Mansel 
2011), women and children’s health and nursing and supportive care. 
A GDG is normally composed of five constituents: the chair; project 
manager; specialist and generalist healthcare professionals and other 
professionals; patients and carers; and technical teams of the rel-
evant NCC. Expert advisers and stakeholders, including pharmaceu-
tical manufacturers, who are not GDG members may be allowed to 
contribute to discussions. A GDG works within NICE’s overarching 
equality scheme and reviews questions, as well as considers the evi-
dence in order to develop recommendations (NICE 2012).
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to prior decisions’ (Achterbergh and Vriens 2010, p. 157). 
Those decisions in turn motivate actions in the organisa-
tion’s physical environment, and those actions may produce 
externalities because those affected have not consented to 
them. Reflexive law thus seeks to influence the way in which 
decisions are made, rather than prescribing ways of acting 
in pursuit of specific goals.
One decision which exercises a strong normative influ-
ence over subsequent organisational decisions is its goal. 
Corporate law is highly permissive with regard to goals, 
and only requires that decisions are made in ‘the interests 
of the corporation’, giving management a broad margin of 
discretion under the ‘business judgement’ rule (Sjåfjell et al. 
2015). However, under market pressures, many corporations 
have adopted the goal of producing shareholder value, com-
monly expressed in terms of return on equity or the cur-
rent share price. As systems of recursively linked decision 
premises, corporations tend to continue to do things which 
worked in the past, unless and until a decision to do things 
differently can be justified and gains acceptance among 
decision-makers. The main insight that systems theory 
contributes to corporate governance regulation is that cor-
porations observe law in their environment and reconstruct 
its demands. Corporations then decide whether and how 
to comply with the law. Since law can threaten sanctions 
(which corporations reconstruct as a financial cost), these 
will be taken into account in making decisions, but a regu-
lator can never be sure how a corporation will respond to a 
particular law. Where law is instrumental, corporations may 
make decisions to act in ways, which frustrate the regulatory 
goal, even if they formally comply with the regulation in 
question. The Basel II Revised International Capital Frame-
work for Banks is a good example of this, with financial cor-
porations complying with the rules about capital, but doing 
it in a way that moves assets and liabilities off balance sheet, 
thus frustrating the primary aim of the regulation, which 
was to control risk-taking (Tahir et al. 2017). They did this 
because the rules threatened their goal and other decisions 
linked to it—namely producing shareholder value.
Reflexive law therefore abandons instrumental regula-
tion in favour of procedural regulation, and aims at steering 
the decision-making process without attempting to impose 
particular outcomes on it. It is a means by which a regulator 
can steer corporations towards greater internalisation of their 
externalities without producing second order effects, or dis-
tortions. In order to achieve this, we suggest two procedural 
norms. First, corporations might be required to consult with 
those who consider themselves affected by the corporation’s 
decision-making so that they learn about their effects on 
their environment and identify means of internalising those 
effects. Second, decision-makers such as directors and man-
agers might be required to take decisions in the interests of 
the corporation, but subject to an obligation to internalise 
any externalities of which they become aware of in the 
course of consulting affected groups. Procedural norms 
such as these would bypass the regulatory trilemma, and, 
by bringing the corporation and affected groups together for 
dialogue at a relatively early stage, would also sidestep many 
of the psychological and sociological barriers to ‘Coasian 
bargaining’ discussed earlier. In this way, it would mark out 
a middle ground between bargaining and regulation, a form 
of ‘regulated self-regulation’.
Michel Callon’s work sheds some light on how this 
might work, and highlights some of the advantages of this 
approach. Callon emphasises that externalities occur because 
they overflow the ‘frames’ used by actors and decision-mak-
ers, and are therefore not taken into account. The frame is 
the boundary within which the interactions in question ‘take 
place more or less independently of their surrounding con-
text’ (Callon 1998, p. 249). What falls outside the frame is 
‘bracketed’ and removed from consideration by the relevant 
actors. As corporations adopt the goal of shareholder value, 
they build up decision-making frames in accordance, and 
exclude anything that is not in accord, with the goal.9 Thus, 
the solution is for decision-makers to expand their frames 
to include more of the externalities that overflow them. Cal-
lon describes the place where decision-makers and affected 
groups meet—so that this broader process of framing may 
occur—as a hybrid forum. This is because ‘facts and val-
ues… become entangled’ and specialists and non-specialists 
have to work together to construct an image of the overflows 
in question (Callon 1998, pp. 260–263). The forum mixes 
together scientific construction of facts with decision-mak-
ing and rule-making, all of which is carried out by a variety 
of actors with different interests and expectations (Callon 
and Rip 1992).10 Whether an overflow is governed by a cor-
porate decision, a contract or regulatory intervention, it has 
to be traced or mapped first. As highlighted by the focus of 
political CSR on collective deliberations in public–private 
9 Corporate managers and shareholders have ‘agreed’ that manag-
ers should make decisions using a frame which includes effects on 
shareholders (measured by reference to the share price or return on 
equity), while effects on third parties will only come within the frame 
if management considers that they are likely to have consequences for 
returns to shareholders. This may be the case, for example, where a 
particular action is illegal or where it is likely to harm the corpora-
tion’s reputation. Other consequences of corporate activity, such as 
long term and diffuse effects on the environment or other ‘difficult to 
measure’ externalities, will be bracketed outside the corporate frame 
and will not be taken into account by management. Like Coase, Cal-
lon recognises that externalities are ‘the rule’ rather than an excep-
tion.
10 Callon’s more recent work has focused on the role of hybrid 
forums in constructing acceptable solutions to issues of public con-
cern such as deep burial of nuclear waste or the spread of Bovine 
Spongiform Encehpalitis (BSE) in the United Kingdom (Callon et al. 
2009).
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representative organisations (Young 2004; Scherer et al. 
2014), a hybrid forum helps to trace overflows and identify 
appropriate and mutually acceptable ways of dealing with 
them. This does not necessarily entail producing a bespoke 
way of dealing with a particular, fully specified externality. 
Rather, it could be a decision premise which tells corpo-
rate decision-makers how to act where they identify specific 
facts in the corporation’s environment, or it could involve 
the creation of norms about how the hybrid forum ought to 
proceed in relation to a class of externalities.
Callon and Rip (1992) note that the role of the hybrid 
forum (or ‘expertise’ as they term it) is to establish an 
acceptable alignment between what one knows (or believes 
one knows), what the actors want and expect (which may 
be contradictory) and the procedures to follow in order to 
establish norms. They argue that norms that emerge from 
these forums must be ‘scientifically plausible’, ‘socially 
viable’ and ‘juridically acceptable’. Where all three criteria 
are satisfied, the norm will ‘stabilise for a certain period an 
agreement on what one knows, what is socially acceptable 
and the rules for reaching agreement’ (Callon and Rip 1992, 
p. 153). Like corporate decision premises, these norms are 
always revisable, and represent an arrangement which is ‘by 
no means perfect, but is acceptable’ because it is ‘collec-
tively elaborated, constructed, and by which we reconcile 
our differences, at least for a limited period’ (Callon and Rip 
1992, p. 154). Although his work is not normative and does 
not address the governance of externalities through the cor-
porate decision-making process, Callon’s approach informs 
the design of reflexive regulation designed to steer corpora-
tions to identify the social costs they create and appropriate 
means of internalising them.
While this is a fresh and provocative argument, it is 
beginning to gain some currency with policy makers, with 
the European Commission now defining CSR as ‘the respon-
sibility of enterprises for their impacts on society’ (European 
Commission 2011). This change in approach is potentially of 
great importance as it appears to extend the United Nations’ 
Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights beyond 
human rights concerns to encompass other externalities. 
However, the proposal that corporations should constitute 
hybrid fora to guide their decision-making implies the need 
to develop procedures for the hybrid fora. Such procedures 
are lacking from the Commission’s 2011 communication, 
which simply refers to ‘a process to integrate social, envi-
ronmental, ethical, human rights and consumer concerns 
into their business operations and core strategy in close col-
laboration with their stakeholders’ (European Commission 
2011). Research into reflexive governance emphasises that 
the rules governing interactions between stakeholders should 
be established by the participants and revised in the light of 
experience. Lenoble and Maesschalck (2006) describe this 
as a ‘pragmatic’ approach to reflexive governance. It extends 
beyond the development of ‘shared understandings’ and 
appropriate solutions to give stakeholders ‘choice as to how 
to choose’, thereby allowing them to improve and develop 
the very mechanisms of their participation over time.
While desirable in theory, this proposal, like all proposals 
for collective action or decision-making, raises some que-
ries. For example, must everyone concerned by a particular 
activity agree on the facts that are constructed and the pro-
posed solution, or will a majority suffice? What are the ways 
of establishing the procedural norms of the hybrid forum? 
There is potential here for hold-up or for more socially or 
economically powerful groups to dominate proceedings. It 
may be that these are questions that can be left to the forum 
itself. It may also be that the law, through the imposition of 
standards, can prevent unduly long, unruly or unfair par-
ticipation (Sarra 2011). However, this is not a fatal objec-
tion to the suggestion, as corporate law has had to deal with 
similar problems regarding relations between majority and 
minority shareholders, and between board and shareholders, 
and it managed to avoid deadlock while remaining, for the 
most part, permissive and facilitative for effective corporate 
governance. We argue that this is achievable in relation to 
a hybrid forum.
The second query concerns how to guarantee that the 
forum will be a place of mutual learning and dialogue which 
transcends self-interest. These are challenges that all reflex-
ive law or ‘new governance’ proposals must confront. It is 
clear that they will not be addressed through regulations and 
prescriptive rules because the regulator cannot anticipate the 
factual context of particular decisions. It is possible that the 
public nature of proceedings would constrain some of the 
most intense self-interest seeking. It may be that by embed-
ding CSR considerations in the corporate governance pro-
cess, the law brings about a change in people’s conceptions 
of the role of corporations in society, and in the governance 
of externalities. However, we recognise that hybrid fora are 
not a silver bullet, and that corporations may not engage 
with them in good faith, in much the same way as many 
currently treat regulation. However, all of this remains to be 
seen and answers to these questions will only be identified 
through experimentation. Irrespective, an important advan-
tage of our proposal to elevate externality internalisation 
to the status of a corporate goal is that it would provide a 
decision premise that exercises a normative influence on all 
corporate decision-making.
Indeed, while reflexive governance raises a number of 
difficult questions, it offers a number of advantages in terms 
of governing externalities compared with instrumental 
regulation and Coasian bargaining. Instrumental regula-
tion requires the regulator to identify in advance the type 
of externality and to prescribe how corporations should 
respond to the occurrence of that kind of externality. With-
out detailed knowledge of the context, this is extremely 
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difficult. Reflexive governance has greater capacity both 
in terms of identifying externalities on an ongoing basis, 
and in terms of generating mutually acceptable solutions. A 
hybrid forum might also be a more effective, efficient and 
a fairer way of constructing facts than interest group lob-
bying in a political process. It also offers advantages when 
compared with litigation. Although judges only have to deal 
with one specific factual context, their adversarial proce-
dures make courts a very expensive method of construct-
ing facts, and give rise to antagonism between the parties. 
Moreover, courts are limited as to the remedies they can 
award. As for Coasian bargaining, it is far from clear that 
the parties to an externality ever get together of their own 
accord to agree on the facts about a particular externality. If 
the law were to require companies to publicly consult those 
who consider themselves affected, there would be a better 
chance of a mutually acceptable set of facts emerging, and 
there will be a greater scope for the parties to identify a 
remedy that satisfies everyone. This argument suggests that a 
hybrid forum may well be a lower cost means of identifying 
and addressing externalities than instrumental regulation or 
Coasian bargaining. At the very least, therefore, regulators 
should consider our approach as an alternative mechanism 
for the governance of externalities, especially where it seems 
likely that there are complex, ‘socio-technical’ externalities. 
In other words, reflexive governance helps to explain how 
hybrid fora, underpinned by procedural norms that accord 
with the tenets of reflexive law, would be a valuable addition 
to the regulatory toolbox. Table 1 presents the comparative 
advantages of our obligated approach in governing externali-
ties, in relation to previously discussed options.
Contributions and Implications
The extant literature does not clarify how social costs/
negative externalities should be addressed. This article has 
developed an alternative framing of CSR as an obligated 
act of responsibility on corporations to identify and inter-
nalise their negative externalities. We argued that a business 
case for the internalisation of these externalities (strategic/
instrumental CSR in management scholarship) is irrelevant; 
Table 1  Public policy toolbox: comparison of options
Instrumental regulation of a specific 
social cost
Coasian bargaining with specific 
stakeholders
Obligated internalisation of a specific 
social cost
Who is involved? Government and administrative agen-
cies
Firms and affected groups Firms and affected groups within an 
overarching legal framework
When is it useful? Public interest protection and outcomes 
within a single jurisdiction where 
chains of causation are known
Self-interest protection and private 
outcomes where regulatory costs are 
high
Appropriate for complex, functionally 
differentiated societies where prescrip-
tive interventions in the legal system 
create interference in other social 
subsystems
Public interest protection and outcomes 
through transparency and robust delib-
eration
Strengths (Claimed) Certainty of outcomes
Enforcement incentive for compliance
Efficient
Collaborative (limited, private)
Legitimacy from parties’ perspective
It can be used to regulate social systems 
‘that otherwise would be impossible to 
regulate’ (Febbrajo, 1992, p. 30)
Shared public–private regulation
Enforceable procedural rights
Greater scope for identification and 
internalisation
Efficient
Reduced information asymmetry
Reduced regulatory capture
Mandatory stakeholder engagement
Proactive and experimental
Weaknesses Information asymmetry for regulator
Non-collaborative
Inefficient determination of outcomes
Reactive
Potential regulatory capture
It struggles to deal with transnational 
issues
Information asymmetry: it is difficult 
for the regulator to identify social 
costs before they occur
Transparency issues
Self-interest orientated
Assumes clear property rights will 
allow rational calculation; narrow 
transaction costs are the only barrier 
to agreement; and that parties will 
agree on the nature, existence and 
extent of an externality ex ante.
Not suitable to identify and prevent 
irreversible harms.
Stakeholders’ willingness and ability to 
participate
Competing self-interests
Potential dominance of one group
Learning may not occur leading to high 
costs
Possible inefficient procedural norms and 
practices
Corporations may not engage in good 
faith
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rather, this internalisation approach should be the primary 
framing of CSR. This argument extended the emergent 
political CSR discourse and proposes reflexive governance/
hybrid fora as a way to operationalise our obligated approach 
to governing social costs. The article advances the internali-
sation reframing of CSR on the one hand and the implemen-
tation through hybrid fora on the other hand. This refram-
ing rests on both ethical and self-governance premises. We 
argued that while our proposition may offer some degree of 
economic efficiency, firms should primarily internalise all 
identified social costs.
We advance the theory, practice and policy of how to fully 
address social costs or negative externalities, and respond to 
the increasing stakeholder criticisms of firms, by arguing 
that since firms cannot properly neglect their externalities, 
they should internalise those externalities. We showed that 
framing CSR in this way potentially allows it to resolve the 
governance deficit and become a means of efficient govern-
ance of social cost provided two conditions are met. First, 
CSR must be understood as the responsibility of corpora-
tions for identifying and internalising the externalities their 
operations create. This requires corporate decision-makers to 
change the frames used to bring social costs within the scope 
of what they take into account. Second, corporations must 
be steered towards a socially adequate identification and 
internalisation of those costs by the careful use of reflexive 
governance. A reflexive approach to CSR would require that 
corporations engage in dialogue with those who consider 
themselves affected in order to construct the ‘facts’ about 
the externality, and then require corporate decision-makers 
to internalise that externality in an acceptable manner. This 
would arguably result in the identification and correction 
of more externalities. The procedural rights to participate 
in this process would be enforceable, whether by public or 
private actors. As shown in Table 1, our obligated approach 
is an additional method of governing social costs, to be used 
as an alternative or complement to the other, more conven-
tional methods of governing externalities.
However, an important question remains. Will corpora-
tions go beyond what the law requires where their managers 
cannot advance a ‘business case’ for doing so? As discussed 
in this article, this is problematic from the perspective of the 
wider corporate governance system, which creates powerful 
incentives to increase short-term shareholder value. Mak-
ing the (admittedly large) assumption that this barrier can 
be overcome, this article has argued that CSR can become 
one possible mechanism by which corporate activities can 
be governed so as to internalise social costs. In this regard, 
CSR should be framed and promoted as a necessary con-
dition for carrying on in business and not an option that 
can be dropped at will—especially when it does not sup-
port corporate financial performance. Framing CSR in this 
way requires corporate management to understand CSR 
as the process of sustainable governance and resolution of 
externalities (Crouch 2006). Such an understanding of CSR 
provides a concrete rationale for stakeholder engagement, 
namely the identification and efficient correction of exter-
nalities and the social costs arising from them. Furthermore, 
our approach helps to deal with social costs, in a way that 
meets that allows corporations to make a wider contribution 
to the public good.
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